BullyPolitik - Steinmeier's Missing Link.

German president Steinmeier gave an interview to the TransPond-NeoLiberal Spiegel, in which he discussed the “evolution” of Vladimir Putin.

Steinmeir began by noting that, in 2001, Putin gave a speech to the Bundestag, in Geman, “the language of Goethe, Schiller and Kant.”

It always cracks me up when elevated personages like Steinmeir truck out hackneyed phrases like “the language of Goethe, Schiller and Kant.” Has Steinmeir actually read Kant? German is hard enough without being extolled as the language of a man so obtuse that German philosophy students study English in order read translations that are passably intelligible.

Anyways, Steinmeir was trying to say something to the effect that Putin was actually able to speak the language of the highest sentiments.... whatever that had to do with anything. At least he was a far sight more accomplished than American “statesmen” who have trouble speaking their own language.

In any event, during that speech, Putin's “central message,” according to Steinmeir, was “that he wanted to join Germany and Europe on the path to freedom and democracy.”

Did Steinmeir mean to suggest that Germany and Europe had not actually attained “freedom and democracy” but were only on the path toward those noble goals?

Whatever Steinmeir had in mind, I rather doubt that Putin is susceptible to such exagerated sentimentality. But I do not doubt, what he said often enough in “the language of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Lenin!”, was that he wanted closer, cooperative relations with “the West” in terms of trade, investment, political stability and military security. In so saying Putin was not striking new ground, but rather was simply accepting an offer that had been made by that famous realpolitik duo, James Baker and GHW Bush.

Steinmeir continued his interview stating that in October 2017 “I met again with Putin. It was a frosty conversation. Animosity to the West, and especially to the U.S., had become his dominating ideology. That was an extremely bitter realization.”

Steinmeir rather cryptically did not specify to whom “that” was a “bitter realization.” Suffice it to say that the earlier Putin who was willing to join the pilgrimage toward freedom and democracy “has nothing in common with the Putin of 2022, who we are now experiencing as a brutal, entrenched warmonger.”

Imagine that! Putin just mysteriously flip-flopped, as if suddenly developing a mental disease! Who could possible figure out why!

Let us examine the “bitter realization.” Let us go back to early 1990, two months after the German People more or less reunited themselves de facto; and, just as importantly, a year after the Soviet Union decided to “liberalize” their economy. Two issues arose: (1) what to do with a reunited Germany and (2) how to incorporate Russia into the West's free market trade regime.

With respect to the first issue, Russia was afraid of the aggressive potential of a reunited Germany. Russia had mixed feelings over whether a united Germany should remain within NATO. Such a state of affairs would “push” NATO eastward, but at the same time it would tend to restrain any German unilateralism. In discussions with James Baker the Russians signaled that they would actually prefer that that U.S. keep its troops in Europe, as part of an overall “security architecture” that protected the interests of everyone on the continent. Noteworthy in this regard is what James Baker said to Gorbachev during their meetting in February 1990. As recounted in a memo to Bush, “Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before. But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.” (Unclassified Memorandum of Conversation on 9 February 1990.)

With respect to the second issue, during the same February 1990 meeting with Gorbachev, Baker volunteered economic advice on the order of steps to be taken by Russia in its switch from a comand to a market economy, while at the same time protecting the value of the ruble and providing a “social safety net... when a new pricing system is put in place.” Baker, apologized for offering free advice, but added “Please understand how much we want to see you succeed. As things move, if we are doing something we shouldn't be or we are not doing something we would be pleased if you picked up the phone and let us know.” (Unclassified Memorandum of Conversation on 9 February 1990.)

A more complete collection of documents can be found [ HERE ] but these two statements reflect the gist of the spirit of raprochment that prevailed at the time. Bush and Baker were not the types to speak the highest poetry in any language. They were hardnosed oil-men/politicians who had the interests of the United States foremost in their minds. However, they saw an opportunity to co-opt Russia into a new global, neo-liberal framework. Russia was willing.

In that first year of the last decade of the century, there was much talk about a “peace dividend.” Erecting a new global order involved myriad military, economic, geo-political and technical problems that would need to be worked out. But the overall gist of the matter was that the end of the Cold War meant that less money needed to be spent on defence and more money would be available for social and environmental causes.

One guess as to who did not like that kind of dividend. Within the U.S. Government, opposition arose to treating Russia like a friend. She was no longer an enemy, they said, but remained a potential enemy and it was necessary for the United States to be prepared to defend against this and any other adverse potential.

In March 1992, the New York Times obtained and leaked a collection of government memos which became known as Dick Cheney's “Defence Planning Guide.” The DPG was actually a draft that went through several iterations but it represented Neocon thinking within the Government.

“Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This ... requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.

“We must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. ...

“[We should] encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems."

In plain English: The U.S. is top dog. It must continue to be top dog. It should slap down anyone who even aspires to anything more than a totally subordinate role, in a world otherwise dominated by American investment (“open economic system”).

Senator Edward M. Kennedy labeled the DPG "a call for 21st century American imperialism that no other nation can or should accept.”

It is unclear whether Baker and Bush were being utterly duplicitous in their assurances to Russia or whether the DPG represented dynamic tension within the Bush administration. Whatever the case, it needs to be stressed that this Neocon doctrine of BullyPolitik has, with remarkable consistency, remained at the core of American policy for three decades, regardless of who was president. The differences between administrations were merely differences in rhetoric.

The objective reality is that after Baker assured Gorbachev that the U.S. would not move one inch eastward, after German reunifaction, it did precisely the opposite, extending both the EU and NATO into Eastern Europe, while at the same time opposing Russian economic initiatives. Simone de Beauvoir famously said that “When an individual (or a group of individuals) is kept in a situation of inferiority, the fact is that he is inferior.” Likewise, if a country is treated as an enemy it will become an enemy, which is precisely what the United States has contrived to do.

The “prescience” of the DPG is a wonder to behold. It warned against the “potential” of terrorism; against the “potential” hostility of Iraq; against the “potential” trouble n Afghanistan; against the “potential” re-emergence of a strong Russia... And somehow all these “potentials” managed to actualize themselves. They did so because no self-respecting country can agree to becoming a bootlick to the United States and so, the seeds of conflict are sown.

Throughout the last decade, Putin has expressed bafflement that “our partners” (as he put it) in the West were behaving the way they were. I at first thought it curious that he consistently referred to the West as “partners” until I realized that he was hearkening back to the assurances of Baker and Bush.

Now, it may be that capitalism is a deceiving siren. The allure presented is that of an open system of global free trade in which all players are friendly competitors -- a sort of financial kumbayah song fest cum American football game. But what happens when two countries are competing over the same thing, say for example, Russian versus American gas? As in any capitalist scenario, one man's gain is the other's loss.

“Why, my fellow citizens, is there any man here or any woman, let me say is there any child here, who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry?” (Woodrow Wilson, "The Ideals of America," ) [ The Atlantic (Dec 1902.) ]

Wilson, a man who “talked like Jesus Christ but acted like Lloyd George,” was no dreamer. “Making the world safe for democracy” meant making it safe for American investment; that is to say, economic penetration and hegemony. Wilson understood that, just as in sports, a friendly competition in business can often end up in a fight. Not being the sort to believe in universal socialism, Wilson's solution was to get nations to commit to binding arbitration.

From a practical perspective, it was not a bad idea. Once nations realized that the economic, physical and human devastations of war outweighed any disputed economic interest they would commit to loosing one dispute today in order to win another tomorrow. Fail safe? No. Better than the alternative? Yes. And in fact, although the first attempt ended in failure, post 1945 the international community has indeed put in place a plethora of international supervisory institutions and mechanisms for arbitation. Thus, it was not pie-in-the-sky, back in 1990 when people hoped for a peace dividend by brining Russia in from the cold.

But the American Neocons would have none of it. From Pentagon planning groups, to conservative think tanks, to national security advisors, the niebelungen of the military-industrial complex pushed for more military spending and more confrontation in identified “problem” areas around the world. The geopolitical goal was distilled by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his The Grand Chessboard.

"In brief," he writes, "the U.S. policy goal must be unapologetically twofold: to perpetuate America's own dominant position for at least a generation and preferably longer still; and to create a geopolitical framework that can absorb the inevitable shocks and strains of social-political change .... Th[e] huge, oddly shaped Eurasian chessboard -- extending from Lisbon to Vladivostok -- provides the setting for 'the game,"

Far more sophisticated than the average Neocon Neanderthal, Brzezinski talked out of both times of his mouth. At times he sings the swan song of mutual cooperation with American being a sort of avuncular first among equals.

'If the middle space can be drawn increasingly into the expanding orbit of the West (where America preponderates), if the southern region is not subjected to domination by a single player, and if the East is not unified in a manner that prompts the expulsion of America from its offshore bases, America can then be said to prevail. But if the middle space rebuffs the West, becomes an assertive single entity, and either gains control over the South or forms an alliance with the major Eastern actor, then America's primacy in Eurasia shrinks dramatically.''

More often he is the hardnosed brutalist:

“"How America 'manages' Eurasia is critical. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world's three most advanced and economically productive regions” and "It is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges capable of dominating Eurasia and thus of also challenging America.”

"Managing Eurasia" remains the lynchpin of American stragegy. As per the National Defense Strategy Doctrine of 2018:

“The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia....” etc.

There is no reason not to take these people at their word. They were not writing for the Ladies Book Club. They were writing to and for themselves as the managers of U.S. economic, political and military strategy. When they say that America has to be the top dog; that its zone's of influence should be “secured and extended,” that its “security perimeter” should be pushed “eastward.” They mean it. And when the geopolitical facts on the ground incrementally reflect those goals, then you know they are achieving them.

At all times in history, “crises” are presented to the public as suddenly arising emergencies. But they are not. Ukraine is a perfect example. To the American and Western public, Russia's invasion of the Ukraine is portrayed as arising ex nihilo... the acts of a “deranged” and “isolated” despot. And, of course, being so portrayed who cannot but support the brave Ukrainians defending their homeland? But studiously absent from “liberal democratic coverage” has been any serious or (for that matter) truthful reporting or discussion on the overthrow of president Yanukovich in 2014 after he turned down paltry Western enticements in favour of closer trade ties with Russia, or on the five billion spent on the Ukraine by the U.S. in the previous decade, or on the situation in the Donbas, or on Western military equipping, assistance and advising, and joint military exercises with the Ukraine on Ukrainian soil. Was all of this just a hobby, for lack of anything else to do? Or does it have something to do with Brzezinski's argument that NATO had to be expanded and that the Ukraine was critical to America's geopolitical strategy and goals?

Of course, I understand and naturally support the Ukrainians defending their homeland. But I also understand why they are having to. Yes, the immediate cause is the Russian invasion. But the root cause was America's policy of domination and expansion; its blue-print for “21st century American imperialism that no other nation can or should accept.”

But of all this, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany is evidently utterly ignorant. Out of the blue, in 2017, Putin became “frosty.” Steinmeir has no idea why. All he can manage is that Putin has lost all rationality and what “we are now experiencing” is a “brutal, entrenched warmonger.”

What we are experiencing is a president as toady for the party line dictated from elsewhere.


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